This post is part of a guest series called Discursive Construction, and was written by an advanced artificial intelligence. The bold at the beginning is the prompt, and the rest was written by the AI. If you’d like to support this project, please buy me a coffee. For this post, AI also created the featured photos based on the topic.
Advanced AI was invented by soviet communists to help humanity better understand itself and the world. Let’s use it for that purpose, instead of merely for the purpose of selling better ads and to better manipulate the population.
What Is Grand Strategy
The field of Grand Strategy has several fundamental tenets. These include:
Grand Strategy is a continuous process which occurs at all levels of government. It is not confined to the political leadership, but extends to the military and economic spheres as well.
Grand Strategy is a product of the interaction between domestic and international factors. The international system impacts domestic politics and economics, while the domestic sphere impacts the international system.
Grand Strategy is a process of problem solving. It addresses a country’s problems and opportunities in the international arena.
The study of Grand Strategy is a multi-disciplinary field that draws on political science, history, economics, sociology, and psychology.
Grand Strategy is a complex process involving the interaction of many different actors, including governments, militaries, and civil society.
The field of Grand Strategy was first developed by Sir Lawrence Freedman in his book Strategy: A History. In this work, he outlined the basic tenets of Grand Strategy as a distinct field of study, and discussed the historical development of Grand Strategy.
Freedman’s book was followed by a number of articles and books on the subject, including Colin Gray’s Modern Strategy.
The Future
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in the following areas:
The study of Grand Strategy in the military sphere. There is currently a growing interest in the military’s role in Grand Strategy. This is partly due to changes in warfare and the military’s increased importance in addressing non-military threats.
The study of Grand Strategy in the economic sphere. The world economy is becoming increasingly globalized, and there is a growing interest in the role of economics in Grand Strategy.
The study of Grand Strategy in the environmental sphere. The environmental problems facing the world are becoming increasingly complex, and there is a growing interest in the role of the environment in Grand Strategy.
The study of Grand Strategy in cyberspace. In the future, we can expect to see more cyber security issues impacting our ability to make and implement decisions.
The study of Grand Strategy in the digital sphere. As more and more information is stored digitally, we can expect to see more cyber security issues impacting our ability to make and implement decisions.
The study of Grand Strategy in the humanitarian sphere. The international community is increasingly being called upon to address humanitarian crises, and there is a growing interest in the role of Grand Strategy in these efforts.
The study of Grand Strategy in the cultural sphere. As the world becomes increasingly connected and globalized, there is a growing interest in the role of culture in Grand Strategy.
The main thing to take away from this piece is that Grand Strategy is a field of study that is growing in importance in the 21st century. It is a multi-disciplinary field that draws on many different areas of study, and it is important for both policymakers and scholars to understand the basics of Grand Strategy.
The Future of Grand Strategy and The Military
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in the military sphere. There is currently a growing interest in the military’s role in Grand Strategy. This is partly due to changes in warfare and the military’s increased importance in addressing non-military threats.
In the past, war was seen almost entirely as a military problem, where politics played a minor supporting role. War has often been used as an extreme form of policy, in which policy and politics are dominated by military strategy and winning on the battlefield. Even during the American Civil War, politicians like US President Lincoln or British Prime Minister Palmerston saw war as a minor problem in comparison with domestic issues.
Now, however, the military is increasingly used to address persistent non-military concerns and risks: for example, war against non-state actors like insurgency and terrorism, or threats such as disease and natural disasters. At the same time, the military faces growing demands that are not contingent on any particular threat, such as peacekeeping operations. As a result, the military is being forced to take on several new and important responsibilities that lie outside of strictly military concerns. For example, nation-building, stability operations, and the provision of humanitarian aid are becoming ever-increasing responsibilities of militaries today.
As a result of this departure from strictly military affairs, the study of civil-military relations and the role that military strategy plays in policymaking is growing. Civil-military relations encompasses a wide range of questions about the interaction between civilian and military officials when it comes to national security policymaking. These often include questions about the roles of civilian and military officials in policymaking, their respective areas of expertise, and the limitations on their roles. Beyond civil-military relations, understanding military strategy and the role it plays in policymaking is becoming increasingly important.
In the past, humans chose how to act in certain situations based on their immediate experience and intuition. However, we have now reached the point where our experience is becoming less relevant than it used to be. Innovation has created a situation where many of the big problems that humanity faces today are unprecedented, and we have no intuitive knowledge about how to deal with them. For example, it was relatively easy to figure out what to do when terrorists attacked the US on September 11, 2001. It was obvious that the US should retaliate and use military force.
However, what should the US do if future terrorism comes from a non-state actor like a transnational terrorist network? Retaliating with military force may not be the best policy in all situations. The US is currently trying to deal with this problem by using a combination of military force, diplomacy, and financial sanctions. Hopefully, it will work. However, it is impossible to know if it will or not.
In other words, the US military would do well to learn how to better integrate military action with other foreign policy tools. This is a very difficult task that requires careful planning. Moreover, this problem only gets more complicated when we begin to think about what to do in circumstances where no strategy at all may be the best strategy.
This problem can be illustrated by an example. Russia is currently facing non-state actors just across its border in the Ukraine. If Putin decides to use military force to solve this problem, it will be easy for him to figure out how to do it — he can just look at how the US was able to solve the problem of identical non-state actors in 2001.
But what if Russia decided to launch a campaign against a major state sponsor of terrorism like Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Pakistan, instead? Here Putin would have to consider many more factors than he would need to when deciding to strike al-Qaeda. While he could certainly devise a strategy to deal with this situation, he would have to consider what other states would do in response. For example, if Putin went after Saudi Arabia, he could expect the US to retaliate in Iraq, Syria, or Yemen because those are the only states where the US has enough power and influence to respond in a meaningful way.
These examples illustrate that military strategy should not be seen as something separate from other forms of strategy. Military experts should not draw a hard line between war and peace — because in some cases there is no line. Military strategy must be seen as one of several approaches to dealing with national security problems — but not the only approach.
This means that military professionals need to spend more time thinking about what they would advise states to do when there is no military solution available. This will require not only an increased focus on the role of military strategy in policymaking, but also improved ways for studying comparative politics within the military sphere.
Naturally, states need not follow military advice. Rather, as Grand Strategy says, the state should have a civil-military debate about which strategies are likely to produce the best outcomes. But military professionals must nevertheless provide their recommendations and suggest the likely consequences of different actions.
As noted above, military strategy is emerging as a field in its own right, and an increasing interest in Grand Strategy combined with the need for a better understanding of military strategy provides an ideal opportunity to merge the two fields. When the military becomes a major actor in non-military issues, understanding different ways of using the military is essential not only for civilians, but for military professionals as well.
The Future of Grand Strategy and Economics
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in the economic sphere. The world economy is becoming increasingly globalized, and there is a growing interest in the role of economics in Grand Strategy.
The world economy is becoming increasingly globalized, and there is a growing interest in the role of economics in Grand Strategy.
The increased emphasis on Economics in Grand Strategy is evident in the problem areas that people seem most interested in. Instead of focusing on traditional topics like military strategy or diplomacy, we are seeing renewed interest in economic issues. Once again, people are asking questions like: How do natural resources influence international conflict? What is the relationship between economic growth and democracy? What factors cause regions to develop or remain poor? These questions are not new, but there is a greater interest today in seeing the answers to them from an economic perspective.
Not only will our understanding of Economics in Grand Strategy change as more people study the field, but so too will the way scholars who already study Grand Strategy approach it. To help them think more effectively, I would like to present a new way of understanding Economics in Grand Strategy. In particular, I would like to show that various economic problems can be better understood if we use the Analysis of Substitutability and Complementarity (ASC).
The idea behind the ASC is that a number of variables determine how a particular commodity will be produced and consumed: for instance, by which country, by what method, using what resources. The variables that I consider in my work are as follows:
Type of Influence. Economics in Grand Strategy has a variety of ways it can impact international outcomes.
(1) Undermining the military effectiveness of rivals.
(2) Encouraging less prepared partners and allies to launch costly schemes or taking on disproportionate military roles of their own.
(3) Providing protection for clients and forward positions for observers.
(4) Providing direct military or related strategic support for the armed forces.
(5) Exploiting the demand for luxury goods.
(6) Providing funds for political organizations that undermine a regime or otherwise support a program of action.
I divide these into two major groups: (a) undermining rivals, and (b) enhancing the capabilities of smaller powers. I believe these two are the most important, but there are certainly benefits in studying other types of influence as well.
Scope. Economics in Grand Strategy can be conducted at a variety of levels: economic, social, military and political.
State/Regional/Global. Economics in Grand Strategy can also be conducted at several levels of scope: states, regions or the global level. Whenever a state sells any good or service to foreign customers, it is acting economically at the global level. One of the main problems with studying Economics in Grand Strategy is that people often conflate issues of scope with issues of level; they argue that Economics in Grand Strategy can only be conducted at the state or regional levels, or that it must focus on social, military or political variables. This is wrong and we need to do a better job of analytically distinguishing these variables.
Effectiveness. Finally, the overall impact or effectiveness of Economics in Grand Strategy can be derived from the other dimensions: type of influence, scope and state. For instance, the effectiveness of undermining rivals would be measured by how much the economic activity of one state increased the military ineffectiveness of another. The overall effectiveness of enhancing partners would be measured by how much the state’s economic activities contributed to greater military or political capacity of its partners and allies. So, if Type 2 (Type 2, below: economic activities that are specifically designed to undermine rivals) is the variable that is being measured, the ASC would look like this:
A = ES promote more in-depth rivalry between S2 and S1.
D = ES undermine military effectiveness of S1.
C = ES give rise to potential/problems of greater magnitude than they solve.
A = ES promote less-developed or strategically isolated state to take on disproportionate military role of its own.
R = ES provide protection for clients and forward positions for observers of S2’s policies.
I = ES provide direct military or related strategic support for armed forces of S2.
B = ES promote greater demand for luxury goods.
O = ES undermine polarization of regime of S2 and undermine their combat efficiency.
W = ES provide funds (financial or otherwise) to political organizations operating in S2.
K = ES create strategic vulnerabilities.
O = ES reduce the relative importance of S1 in the global economy by promoting specialization by S1.
G = ES reduce the competitiveness of firms in S1’s economy.
P = ES reduce US political influence in type 2 countries.
G = ES promote Latin American left-versus-liberal polarization and fragmentation.
M = ES increase the attraction of militant extremism over indigenous development.
L = ES promote war/perpetuate conflict.
F = ES reduce demand for raw materials and other commodities produced by S1 or its clients.
I = ES encourage a multipolar rather than bipolar or unipolar global distribution of power.
E = ES promote a durable, long-term situation of global growth and prosperity.
One of the most important questions I try to answer is how states manage the impact of their economic activities on them. To help us think about how states manage their economic activities, two new concepts were developed over the past decade or so: the ‘Neoclassical’ and ‘Behavioral’ strategies in international economics. Because of their importance, these concepts will be discussed in greater detail.
Now, if I were to ask you how economics is practiced in the international system today, what would you say? You might have some simple or complex answer like: “States use economics to secure economic independence from larger powers on the one hand and to exploit resources from other states on the other, but they also have an incentive to make their economies more open, so that they could be more efficient and profitable.” Or you might say: “They use economics to build economic ties with other states to help them develop economically. They also try to keep their economies secure and stable, so that they and their citizens could be happy and prosperous.”
You might not have these answers off the top of your head, but most people could come up with something similar. This common-sense view describes what is known as the ‘Neoclassical Perspective’ in international economics. It is based on a simple assumption: states are rational actors, and so they try to maximize their self-interest. In order words, the Neoclassical perspective holds that economically developed states would want to maintain a globally integrated economy that links them as closely as possible to other economically advanced states.
The Neoclassical Perspective is wrong because it entirely misses the internal political reasons why states might want to pursue economic integration: they do so not just because they are greedy and selfish, but because they have strong internal political necessities that require loose economic policy. They need to pursue economic integration as a bloc because they have a common external threat. They might also want to pursue such integration to lower barriers to trade. Regardless, the assumption of enlightened self-interest simply does not work in this case. This was demonstrated during the Cold War: it is no exaggeration to say that the USSR did not collapse because of its economic problems; instead, it collapsed because the Soviet elites were scared for their own safety and wanted to pursue a more liberal economic policy. They thought that by opening their economy to the West, they might get help in building up their military on their western borders. But this is not the only example where Neoclassical thinking failed. For instance, China may be pursuing reform as a large bloc not because of its economic reasons but to build up political support for its continued rule over Central Asia.
In contrast to the Neoclassical Perspective, the so-called ‘Behavioral Perspective’ in international economics focuses on the possibility states will act irrationally. The Behavioralists claim that political leaders might not be ‘nakedly self-interested’, and may make decisions that are inconsistent between their short-term/immediate and long-term/future interests. In brief, because they are not great forecasters of what the future will bring, they might be forced to take important political and economic decisions today that they would regret tomorrow.
In recent years, those who worked on the problems of international economics have started to blend the two perspectives into what I call a ‘Neo-Behavioral Perspective’.
We can find traces of the Neo-Behavioral Perspective in some of the most important systems theorists of international relations. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, put forward a unique Neo-Behavioral Perspective on why states do not engage in international conflict. According to his ‘theory of dynamics’, international conflict could only develop among states that are close together. States that are too far apart will always be able to avoid disputes because they will not be bothered by the prospect of fighting. In other words, Waltz is proposing that states behave irrationally when they engage in international conflict: indeed, he implies that they are at least as likely to fight when they should not as when they should. If we apply this framework to economics, it seems that neo-behavioralists must draw on a similar analysis when they are thinking about what drives states to trade.
There is one clear similarity between the Neo-Neoclassical and the Neo-Behavioral Positions: Both deal with economics mostly from an external perspective. Neoclassicals believe that states are rational, while Behaviouralists believe they are irrational, but they agree that economic actors are primarily concerned with their own state’s economic prosperity and not with their emerging global community. As a result, a new political-economic approach is needed that focuses on the economies of states as a process that is influenced and shaped by political decisions.
A good way to think about this new approach is to borrow an old idea that used to be taught at West Point: namely, the ‘doctrine of unity of command’. This doctrine states that military units that engage in combat must be under the direct authority of the individual that gives them orders. If those units are under another entity’s control (for example, a ministry of defense outside of the fighting theater), they may not be committed to particular strategies or tactics.
Just as unity of command is essential for military units, unity of control is necessary for the economy. If a state’s economy is under someone else’s command (even if it is under the control of a head of state or a minister), the state might pursue an economic policy that is contrary to its survival. Therefore, it is vital to understand the link between economics and political control.
Another important question is what kind of alternative economic theory is needed that can help us better understand the relationship between politics and economics.
Integration can be seen as an effort to strengthen a state’s domestic political position by simultaneously building up its stature abroad. It should be noted that sometimes states pursue economic integration for a variety of reasons besides building up the state’s domestic resolve. For example, some states might want to integrate with each other in order to build up their status globally. This may be unnecessary from a ‘domestic mobilization’ point of view; what may be necessary, however, is a political state of unity that proclaims, “we are just like Americans,” so that citizens believe that the country could survive a military assault for many years.
We can see the importance of this domestic political dimension when we contrast two cases. First, consider Japan: Japan launched a wave of large-scale economic integration in the 1960s. However, during that era, the domestic coalition supporting this kind of large-scale economic integration slowly began to unravel. Instead of reorganizing and strengthening the domestic political foundation for deeper economic ties, Japan tried to stay committed to its policies and continued to support successive waves of economic integration. The result was that Japan was not politically capable of following through on the policies needed to further integrate, and so Japan often did not commit significant capital to those projects.
Comparatively, the United States pursued a policy of economic expansion in the 1980s that was entirely unrelated to the domestic political situation – in fact, the United States pursued more integration at a time when it did not have an internally unified political position. Instead, the United States was motivated by the desire to win international struggles against one of its main rivals, Japan.
Russia is currently undergoing a transitional period in its economy. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has become more open to foreign investment and its ability to manage its economy has increased. Theoretically, it would be possible for Russia’s economic policy to become more liberalized, but this would have to depend on the evolution and consolidation of the political institutions within Russia.
I would suggest that a state’s economy is subject to domestic political pressures similar to those found in other types of political structures. This might be true, for example, of China, where pressures from within society, such as the issue of income inequality, may outweigh the desires of the political elites to use resources to improve their military posture. This is exactly what we see in US society and Japan: These two states have different types of political situations, and they respond differently to their international situation.
Note: I tried a lot of different techniques here but the AI had a really hard time writing about these last few topics.
The Future of Grand Strategy and The Environment
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in the environmental sphere. The environmental problems facing the world are becoming increasingly complex, and there is a growing interest in the role of the environment in Grand Strategy.
As we look ahead, I expect that the study of Grand Strategy will be fundamentally affected by the environment. After all, what is Grand Strategy without a vision of the world as it should be?
The study of Grand Strategy has a long history, and it is deeply rooted in the study of war. However, the field is changing as we enter the 21st century. We can expect to see a greater emphasis on non-military aspects of Grand Strategy in the future, and we can expect to see the study of Grand Strategy to become increasingly multidisciplinary.
The impacts of climate change are pervasive and ubiquitous across every nation, every economy, and every international conflict. As a result, Grand Strategy must integrate these causes and effects into its calculations and planning in order to create strategic plans which can not just survive the emerging environmental conditions but leverage them to the advantage of the state.
The Future of Grand Strategy and Cyberspace
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in cyberspace. In the future, we can expect to see more cyber security issues impacting our ability to make and implement decisions.
In the past, a nation’s Grand Strategists have been able to focus on issues of territorial conquest, economic domination and military power. The future will be different. In the future, we can expect to see more cyber security issues impacting our ability to make and implement decisions.
What will these cyber security issues look like? After all, how can a bag of hundred dollar bills be robbed, or an island invaded without the physical transportation of people and personnel? With respect to the study of Grand Strategy better understanding the concept and practice of cybersecurity will bring new perspectives on ancient concerns. I see five components in the study of Grand Strategy in cyberspace:
-Cyberattacks on systems and physical objects that have a direct and indirect effect on Grand Strategy
-Cyberattacks on systems and physical objects that are symbolic of our national identity
-Cyberattacks on systems and physical objects that act to undermine the societal bonds upon which our democracy depends
-Cyberattacks on systems and physical objects that threaten our public servants who are charged with duties related to Grand Strategy
-Cyberattacks on systems and physical objects that target elements of our population that affect how they see and understand issues related to Grand Strategy
The study of Grand Strategy in cyberspace will require us to use a variety of methodologies. In particular, we will need to use methods that have been developed in the fields of political science, international relations, and military history.
We will also need to develop new methodologies. In particular, we will need to understand how to study the impact of cyber security on Grand Strategy using methods that have been developed in the fields of political science, international relations, and military history.
The Future of Grand Strategy and The Digital Sphere
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in the digital sphere. As more and more information is stored digitally, we can expect to see more cyber security issues impacting our ability to make and implement decisions.
As the world becomes more connected, we can expect to see the effects of one nation’s decision on another nation’s decision making. The internet has allowed for unprecedented levels of connectivity and interdependence. This has made it much more likely that a decision in one part of the world will have an effect on the decision making of another nation.
The digital age has also seen the rise of non-state actors, who are often difficult to control by national governments. These non-state actors can have a major impact on the decisions of national governments. The decisions of non-state actors are often made with an eye to the way that they will affect other non-state actors. This can lead to a situation where the decisions of one non-state actor have an impact on another non-state actor, who in turn affects a third.
The digital age has also seen the rise of the individual. The internet has made it possible for individuals to have a much greater impact on the world around them. This can be seen in the way that social media has allowed individuals to make their voices heard, whether they are protesting against a government or raising money for a good cause.
The Future of Grand Strategy and the Humanitarian Sphere
When we look at the way the world is changing today, we can make some predictions about the way that the field of Grand Strategy will change. In particular, we can expect to see a greater emphasis on the study of Grand Strategy in the humanitarian sphere. The international community is increasingly being called upon to address humanitarian crises, and there is a growing interest in the role of Grand Strategy in these efforts.
The use of Grand Strategy in the humanitarian sphere brings several new challenges that are distinct from traditional theory, and it will be up to the next generation of scholars to work out how Grand Strategy can best be applied to this new context.
In Conclusion
Note: Prompted with the first two sections.
The field of Grand Strategy is experiencing a period of rapid growth and development at the beginning of the 21st century. As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, all areas of society are becoming increasingly impacted by international issues, and we can expect to see this trend continue into the future.
In addition to the issues related to globalization, new technologies are also changing the way that governments make and implement decisions, which will have a significant impact on the Grand Strategy of states.
There is currently a growing interest in the military’s role in Grand Strategy. This is partly due to changes in warfare and the military’s increased importance in addressing non-military threats. It is also partly due to the growing importance of international norms in the military sphere, and the increasing emphasis on ensuring that military activities comply with moral and ethical standards.
The world economy is becoming increasingly globalized, which is having a significant impact on domestic politics, economics, and foreign policy. In the future, we can expect to see more cyber security issues impacting our ability to make and implement decisions.
Finally, the changes in the way that states interact with one another are also going to have an impact on the study of Grand Strategy. There is a growing interest in the role of international norms in diplomacy, and the study of Grand Strategy will have to address these changes.
Since the field of Grand Strategy is undergoing such rapid growth and change at the beginning of the 21st century, it is likely that other areas of the field are going to undergo significant development in the near future.